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■ The landmark case New York Times Co v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) changed libel law 
standards and created the notion of separate 
classifications of individuals who file libel 
lawsuits and what they must prove. 
■ The Supreme Court and lower courts hold 
public figures, public officials and limited-
purpose public figures most prove actual malice 
in order to win damages in libel suits. The Second 
and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals base their 
definition of actual malice from the standard set 
in New York Times Co. 
 ■ Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 
(1967) defined further the difference between 
individuals in terms of libel suits.  
■ The Second and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
interpret actual malice as falsity or a reckless 
disregard for the truth. Furthermore, both courts 
look for ‘clear and convincing evidence’ that there 
is actual malice. 
■ The lower courts have determined and refined 
the classification of individuals through their own 
terms and interpretation. 
■ Due to the evolution of communication, it is 
necessary to reexamine and reevaluate the actual 
malice standard to ensure it is applicable still in 
today’s legal world. 
 
 In U.S. libel law, courts have struggled to implement the various 
elements of libel into ruling standards. Specifically, they have sought to 
find consistency in classifying individuals to determine actual malice, in 
defining the meaning of defamatory words, and categorizing harm 
resulting from libel in cases involving the free press. 
 
 ■ The court opinion of Janklow v. Newsweek 
Inc., 788 F.2d 1300 (1986) reinforced the 
importance of implication, as Justice Arnold 
wrote, “A defamatory communication may consist 
of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a 
statement of this nature is actionable only if it 
implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory 
facts as the basis for the opinion.”  
■ In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 
(1990), Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered a 
Supreme Court decision that supported the notion 
of determining defamatory meaning through 
implication of a statement of fact. Rehnquist 
noted that, “The falsity of the speaker’s beliefs 
and opinions are not at issue; rather, it is the 
falsity of the implied defamatory statement of fact 
that is critical.”  
■ A 1992 Iowa Law Review by C. Thomas Dienes 
and Lee Levine explained how the author can 
have varying states of awareness of the 
defamation, all which can still result in a libel 
action. “The defamatory meaning may arise 
innocently, negligently, knowingly, or 
deliberately. The publisher … may not have even 
considered the meaning that the plaintiff seeks to 
attribute to the publication.” 
 
 ■ Both circuits define harm as result from 
statements about a plaintiff’s alleged criminal 
conduct, loathsome diseases, misconduct in their 
personal professional or occupation, or sexual 
misconduct.  
■ Bodily harm: as sickness or disease, including 
required care, loss of services and death that 
results from the libelous statement.  
■ Pecuniary or special harm: intentional and 
improper interference with another's prospective 
contractual relation, whether the interference 
consists of inducing or otherwise causing a third 
person not to enter into or continue the 
prospective relation or preventing the other from 
acquiring or continuing the prospective relation. 
The statement in question would have to be 
considered defamation per quod.  
■ Emotional harm: encompasses distortion or 
discomforture caused by the defamatory 
statements. The harm done to the plaintiff’s 
psyche must be considered extreme and severe in 
order to hold up in court.  
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